One Nation's Submission to Flood Enquiry
January 27th. 2012
Submitted Feb. / March 2011
Submission to 2011 Flood Inquiry
This submission is based on “other matters” as referred to for submissions in the terms of reference.
1. Wivenhoe Dam control commanders said through the media that during the 2010 / 2011 flood the quantity of water build up and it’s release were governed by a written procedural manual.
2. The Wivenhoe Dam was initially operative as a 60% flood water catchment with a 40% potable water recovery.
3. The 1974 Brisbane flood was the catalyst to build the dam with 60%/40% configuration.
4. In the mid 1980’s the then State government commenced planning for a second major dam to be called “The Wolfdene Dam”. It’s purpose when constructed was to greatly increase the volume of potable water to be made available to consumers in South East Queensland over the 40% available from the Wivenhoe dam.
5. At the end of the 1980’s planning, resumption and ground work were nearing the stage where the dam could have been constructed during the 1990’s.
6. In 1990 a different political party was sworn in as the government of Queensland and it immediately stopped the construction of this dam.
7. Around 2000 / 2003 one or two reports were commissioned with advice to the State government and the Brisbane City council.
8. The 2000 / 2003 reports suggested improvements to the Wivenhoe dam storage to flood mitigation and safety, suggesting a two stage improvement program.
9. A third supplementary report was commissioned by the government that addressed the same issues as in the 2000 / 2003 reports. This report came up with different conclusions.
10. From press accounts the Brisbane city council implemented the first of two stages before 2006. The second recommendation was not constructed and the State government would not contribute financially to the construction of either stage one or stage two!
11. In 2007 the Wivenhoe dam water level was at a critically low potable water level.
12. In 2007 the Queensland State government implemented a major water grid system in South East Queensland that included a desalination plant and a recycled sewrage water treatment system.
13. In January 2011 Brisbane was extensively flooded and the Wivenhoe dam played a roll in the timing and intensity of that flood.
In January 2011 Brisbane was extensively flooded and the Wivenhoe dam played a roll in the timing and intensity of that flood.
This submission concentrates on “State of Mind”
The actual state of mind of those people making critical decisions at a point in time, decisions that could by influence, differ from a particular instruction directed by the written word.
Influences to form a state of mind can be real, positive or distractive, they can be sophisticated and subtle and performed over time or they can be immediate through agitation and aggression or simply be one’s knowledge of the desires of others who were in a sphere of influence.
Such inappropriate influence could distort and adversely restrict a humans ability to apply a positive trait. “Instinct,” by way of common sense, to critical circumstances in instant time.
Through discovery, an assurance by this commission must be forthright and convincing that no political party, commercial group or individual gained favour through influences over genuine honest people to act knowingly or subconsciously in a manner detrimental in society in general.
To the repeated question of why? It is the opinion supporting this submission that the decision time frame relevant to this judicial enquiry starts in 1990 based on the decision in 1990 by the then Premier Wayne Goss to scrap the construction of the Wolfdene dam when it was to be an integral component for the efficiency of the operation of the Wivenhoe dam in time of flooding.
1. Why did Wayne Goss as Premier stop the construction of the Wolfdene dam?
2. Why did he act so quickly without submitting an alternative option?
3. Why did Jim Soorley (Mayor of Brisbane at that time) proceed with recommended flood mitigation improvements to the Wivenhoe dam in the early 2000’s without State government technical and financial support?
4. Why did Premier Beattie fail to support Mayor Soorley on stage one and two of the recommendations?
5. Why did Premier Beattie ignore flood mitigation of Wivenhoe and proceed with a highly expensive water grid when such a project could not immediately serve the major water crisis? (Lack of water in 2007)
6. Why did Premier Bligh not apply benefits from Premier Beattie’s water grid related to available quantities of potable water supply to the level of the Wivenhoe dam prior to the build- up of the 2010 / 2011 wet season? (Major alternative supplies were readily available).
It is respectfully suggested that all questions and answers directly relate to the “State of Mind” at the time of these decisions.
A state of mind from Wayne Goss in 1990, Jim Soorley in 2003, Peter Beattie in 2007 and Anna Bligh in 2010/2011 and the state of mind of those in control of the operational workings of the Wivenhoe dam and others relevant to this enquiry existed and ultimately caused this tragedy!
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